Since
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the catastrophic effects of nuclear
weapons have driven global leaders to pursue concrete steps to reduce the
threat of nuclear weapons use. Yet the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by
the world’s
nine nuclear-armed states—in
response to conventional attack, in response to a nuclear attack, or as the
result of accidental exchange—remains.
As global leaders and the public consider how to reduce the nuclear threat, the
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons underscore why they need to act with greater urgency.
Over
time, our understanding of the scope of these effects has become more
sophisticated. Early studies found that the direct effects of a
large-scale nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic regional and national
damage that would kill tens of millions and likely several hundred million
people within one month of the initial exchange.[1]
More
comprehensive studies in mid-1980s found that the direct effects
of such a nuclear large-scale nuclear war involving thousands of nuclear
detonations could result in several hundred million human fatalities, the indirect effects
could be far greater, leading to the loss of one to four billion lives.”[2]
More
recent studies have found that even a smaller nuclear exchange between
India and Pakistan involving just 100 nuclear detonations against urban targets
would kill 20 million people in the first week and loft soot into the global
atmosphere that would reduce surface temperatures by 1.3 degrees Celsius and
disrupt agricultural production and put 1-2 billion people at risk for famine.[3]
These
findings make it clear that any use of nuclear weapons would result in
humanitarian emergencies far beyond the immediate target zones of the warring
parties.
The
Humanitarian Effects Process and the NPT
Appropriately
enough, the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference Final
Document expresses “deep
concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear
weapons and [reaffirmed] the need for all States at all times to comply with
applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”
The
NPT states parties agreed to certain actions to reduce the risk of such an
outcome, including some 22 overlapping nuclear disarmament commitments that
require: changes in nuclear doctrines to diminish the role of nuclear weapons;
reduction of the number of all types of nuclear weapons; changes in the operational
readiness of nuclear weapons to reduce the risk of accidental war; increased
transparency and reporting by the nuclear-weapon states; tangible progress
toward entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
and overcoming the paralysis of the UN’s
disarmament machinery, especially in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
In
keeping with these goals and commitments, the government of Norway hosted a
conference in March 2013 focused on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear
weapons. The conference, which involved 127 government delegations and additional
UN organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and
other civil society groups, was a straightforward, fact-based discussion of the
effects of nuclear weapons detonations. The states agreed to deepen
the dialogue via a follow-up conference will be held in Mexico in February
2014.
In
April 2013, 80 countries joined a statement on the humanitarian
consequences of nuclear war that makes the
very common sense conclusion that that: "It is in the interest of the very
survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any
circumstances."[4] At
the UN First Committee, a similar statement was endorsed by 125 states
underscoring their shared concern about the humanitarian consequences of
nuclear weapons.[5]
A
complimentary, but separate statement on the topic was coordinated by
Australia, which wisely noted that: “Banning
nuclear weapons by itself will not guarantee their elimination without engaging
substantively and constructively those states with nuclear weapons, and
recognising both the security and humanitarian dimensions of the nuclear
weapons debate.”[6] Japan endorsed both
statements.[7]
Unfortunately,
in my view, the five original nuclear-weapon states boycotted the Oslo
conference and criticized the April joint statement as a “distraction” from the NPT and the
implementation of the 2010 action plan.
At
this point, it is hard to see how the humanitarian effects conferences might
distract from any other disarmament or nonproliferation activities,
particularly not the moribund CD.
The
meetings and the statements only serve to direct some sorely needed attention
on the effects of nuclear weapons and the urgent need to make progress to
reduce their role in military doctrines, to reduce the chance of accidental or
deliberate nuclear exchanges and to accelerate the slow pace of progress toward
the fulfillment of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.
The
hostile reaction from the nuclear-weapon states, particularly France and
Russia, is also counterproductive as it has deepened the frustration of the
nonnuclear-weapon states in the slow pace of progress toward the fulfillment of
the nuclear-weapon states disarmament commitments.
Rather
than boycott the conference scheduled for 2014 in Nayarit, the nuclear-armed
states should actively participate and consider joining other nations in a
statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use.
The
real concern that is expressed privately by some officials of the nuclear
weapon states is that the humanitarian effects process may lead to efforts to
convene a diplomatic process leading to the negotiation of a nuclear weapons
convention.
Contrary
to the concerns of some officials from the nuclear-weapons states, the Oslo
Humanitarian Consequences Conference was not designed to and did not serve as
a launching point for an effort to begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons
convention. It is was not one of the items on the agenda and is not an agenda
item for the Nayarit conference.
What
Are the Implications and Next Steps?
There
is clearly a widening gulf between NPT 2010 Review Conference commitments on
disarmament and the actions of the nuclear-weapons states. The call for urgent
action toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is certainly valid and
justified, but it must be translated into a more meaningful proposals that can
challenge dangerous nuclear doctrines and reduce the risk of catastrophic
nuclear war.
To
date, the states involved in organizing the humanitarian consequences of
nuclear weapons conferences have not yet developed let alone reached agreement
on specific proposals for how the findings about the catastrophic impacts of nuclear
war should translate into meaningful changes in nuclear weapons doctrines and
disarmament diplomacy.
Calling
for the negotiation of convention to banning the possession of nuclear weapons
in the CD sends a strong signal of frustration, but is a recipe for inaction.
And at this time and without the participation of the nuclear-armed states,
such a course is an exercise in futility.
In
addition to participating in the Nayarit Conference and perhaps a follow-on
conference in South Africa, the NPT nuclear-weapons states can and should be
more active and more creative about how they can meet the 2010 NPT Review
Conference disarmament commitments—both
in the interest of preserving the NPT, contributing to international
peace and security, and advancing their own national interests.
There
are other ways non-nuclear-weapons states and the nuclear-armed states can
engage with one another to advance the disarmament process, including:
・ Pursue the negotiation a ban on
the use of nuclear weapons. One implication of the
catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons use is that they should not and cannot
be used. A very logical way to meet the NPT Action plan goals of diminishing
the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines
and assuring non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons would be to develop a legally-binding instrument banning
the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose. This is the approach
taken with respect to chemical and biological weapons in 1925 when states
agreed in the Geneva Protocols that their use "has been justly condemned
by the general opinion of the civilized world" and that "this
prohibition shall be universally accepted ... binding alike the conscience and
the practice of nations.” The
negotiation of such a ban on the use of nuclear weapons could take place in a
dedicated diplomatic forum, possibly to be established by the UN General Assembly
(UNGA) and with the input of a Group of Governmental Experts. Even if the
nuclear weapons states do not initially join in the negotiation or sign the
instrument, the process itself and the final product would in the very least
help to delegitimize nuclear weapons and strengthen the global norm against
their use.
・ Require that each of the
nuclear-armed states report on the specific steps they are taking to meet the
NPT goal of “diminishing
the [number,] role and significance of nuclear weapons” in their “military and security concepts,
doctrines and policies.” To
date, only the United States has published a summary of its nuclear weapons
employment doctrine.
・ Require that the nuclear weapon
states explain the effects of their nuclear weapons use doctrines and war
plans, if they were to be carried out, and explain how the use of such weapons
would be consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law. The
June 2013 Report on the Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United
States claims that “[t]he
new guidance makes clear that all plans must also be consistent with the
fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. Accordingly, plans will,
for example, apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and see to
minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects. The
United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian
objects.” The
United States and other nuclear-armed states should be called upon to explain
the legal rationale and practical effects of such guidance. Other states
should, as part of their reporting responsibilities for the 2015 NPT Review
Conference, report in detail on their nuclear weapons employment policies so
that states parties can evaluate whether such practices are consistent with
international humanitarian law. The discussion would, in the very least,
highlight the importance of reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons and
reinforce the norm against their use.
Steps
to Accelerate Progress on Nuclear Disarmament
With
the progress toward most of the key steps outlined in the 2010 disarmament
action plan at a near standstill, it is also essential that the nuclear-armed
states consider, and the non-nuclear-weapon states push for, actions that can
jumpstart the process. Such steps might include:
・ Immediately accelerate
U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear reductions and slash arsenals well below New
START levels. Russia has resisted President Obama’s June 2013 offer to pursue a
one-third cut in U.S. and Russian deployed strategic stockpiles. President
Putin may agree to begin talks on a follow-on treaty to New START, but it is
clear that such a negotiation would be more complex and time-consuming than New
START. In the meantime, the United States and Russia could announce that
they will accelerate reductions to New START levels (1,550 deployed strategic
nuclear warheads) and agree to parallel, reciprocal reductions below these
levels. Russia currently deploys 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads and the
United States deploys about 1,680. Further reductions could be verified through
the existing New START monitoring mechanism.
・ The other nuclear-armed states
could pledge not to increase the overall size of their nuclear stockpiles, so
long as the United States and Russia achieve further progress in reducing all
types of their nuclear weapons. Nuclear
disarmament is a global enterprise that requires leadership from all states,
including China, France, and the United Kingdom. A realistic and pragmatic
contribution to global nuclear disarmament would be for all other nuclear-armed
states to exercise restraint by not increasing the overall size of their
nuclear weapons stockpiles or increasing the size of their fissile material
stockpiles. Such an effort must also involve states outside the NPT,
specifically India and Pakistan, which continue to expand their fissile stocks
and weapons holdings.
Conclusion
Much progress has been achieved to reduce nuclear weapons
risks through concrete nuclear arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation
measures, but it is vital that new approaches be explored to jumpstart progress
toward the elimination of the risk of global nuclear catastrophe. The
humanitarian consequences conferences and follow-up statements are an important
new avenue that should be welcomed and developed into tangible, practical
policy initiatives.
Mr. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association
[1] An April 1979 U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) report found that an exchange of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces
involving a total of approximately 18,000 strategic warheads would kill from
25-100 million people in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Under the scenario
examined the population centers would not be targeted but would be within the
range of effects of the weapons targeted against military and industrial
targets. As a result, the 200 largest cities in each country would be destroyed
and 80% of all cities with 25,000 people or more would be attacked by at least
one nuclear weapon.
[2] Fred Solomon and Robert Q. Marston, eds., The
Medical Implications of Nuclear War (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1986).
[3] Ira Helfand, “The
Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear War,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 43, No. 9 (November 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_11/The-Humanitarian-Consequences-Of-Nuclear-War.
[4] “Joint
Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,” Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, delivered by
Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, Permanent Representative of South Africa, April
24, 2013.
[5] “Joint
Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapon, UNGA First
Committee,” delivered by Ambassador Dell Higgie of New
Zealand, October 21, 2013.
[6] “Joint
Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” UNGA68
First Committee, delivered by Ambassador Peter Woolcott Australian
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geneva and Ambassador for
Disarmament, October 21, 2013.
[7] “Statement
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on the Joint Statement on
the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” October
22, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000047.html.
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