The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
--Exective Summary (in Japanese and English)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)

February 6, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] (3) Nuclear Security: Introduction

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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In response to the increasing concern about “loose nukes” resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2011, international efforts to enhance nuclear security have accelerated and nuclear security tools have been greatly reinforced (augmented). In 2005, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted (has not yet entered into force). In 2007, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) entered into force. In 2011, the fifth revision of Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) was issued. In addition, the two Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 provided opportunities for world leaders to show commitment to strengthening nuclear security by declaring and supporting nuclear security approaches to be taken. Similarly, the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in July 2013, served as a platform for participating countries to make official remarks about their respective nuclear security policies at the Ministerial Meeting at the beginning of the conference. These official statements, as well as the membership status of international conventions and implementation status of the measures recommended to take by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, provide an important overview for assessing the nuclear security performance of each country.   

Nevertheless, the following features pose a challenge to conducting a survey of the nuclear security status of each country. Firstly, there is no legally binding, universal instrument as regards nuclear security. In this regard, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 is expected to serve as a legally binding, universal instrument; however, as the report obligation of the resolution is not fulfilled, it does not function as it is supposed to be. Secondly, due to the sensitivity of nuclear security-related information, it is very difficult to obtain comprehensive information for the evaluation of the actual nuclear security status on a per country basis. Nuclear security related information, particularly regarding threat assessment, a Design Basis Threat (DBT), physical protection systems for facilities and transport of nuclear and other radiological material, as well as the nuclear security plan of each state, is a confidential information in terms of counter-terrorism and is shared only among a very limited group of people with “need-to-know” status. Thirdly, the responsibility of the nuclear security of a state entirely rests with an individual state. In other words, nuclear security requirements need to be established based on national decisions and sovereignty. Each state decides what level of nuclear security requirements to impose in accordance with its own national threat assessment. These features suggest that, unlike nuclear nonproliferation for which safeguards serve as a universal tool, it is difficult to establish performance standards, evaluation criteria, and especially so, a verification mechanism, as regards nuclear security.

In view of these factors, this report surveys the following items to evaluate the nuclear security system and performance of each country. In order to assess nuclear security risks of each, this report considers the existence of nuclear material that is “attractive” for malicious intent, facilities to produce such material, and related activities as indicators. It also examines the accession status to nuclear security related international conventions, implementation status for recommended nuclear security measures, and official statements related to nuclear security approaches, to evaluate the nuclear security performance and status of each county.  

(Drafted by Kazuko Hamada, Japan Atomic Energy Agency)

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