(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
Back to the Contents
A) Accession Status to Nuclear Security Related Conventions
This report surveys the accession status of each country to the following nuclear security and safety related conventions: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Amendment to CPPNM (CPPNM Amendment), International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention), Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The results are summarized in Table 3-4.
CPPNM requires its party states to take appropriate protection measures for international transfer of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, and not permit its transfer in the case such measures are not in place. It also calls for the criminalization of acts including unauthorized receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes damage to any person or property, as well as theft or robbery of nuclear material. It entered into force in 1987.
CPPNM Amendment greatly expands its scope by calling for party states to take protection measures against nuclear facilities and nuclear material in use, storage and transport, and impose regulations to prevent sabotage against nuclear facilities. It was adopted by consensus in 2005, but has not yet entered into force as of December 2013.
Nuclear Terrorism Convention (which became effective in 2007) requires party states to criminalize acts of possession and use of radioactive material or nuclear explosive devices with malicious intent and against those seeking to use and damage nuclear facilities in order to cause radioactive dispersal.
Nuclear Safety Convention is aimed at ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants and became effective in 1996. The discussion to develop this convention started in response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Its party states are required to take legal and administrative measures, report to the review committee established under this convention, and accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants under their jurisdiction. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident obligates its party states to immediately report to the IAEA when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time, and location of the accident and relevant information. It entered into force in 1986. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management calls for its member states to take legal and administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer review by other parties, for the purpose of ensuring safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste. It became effective in 2001. Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency establishes the international framework that enables equipment provision and dispatch of experts with the goals of preventing nuclear accidents and radioactive emergencies from exacerbating and minimizing their impact. It entered into force in 1987. Since these nuclear safety-related conventions impose nuclear safety measures that serve as protective measures for nuclear security purposes as well, they are regarded as nuclear security related international conventions.
Table 3-4 shows the signature and ratification status of each country to these conventions. The differences from the findings of last year’s report are that Syria signed the Nuclear Safety Convention, and that North Korea signed the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
(Table: Signature and Ratification Status for Major Nuclear Security and Safety Related Conventions)
INFCIRC/225.Rev.5 is IAEA’s recommendation document without legally binding force for physical protection measures for nuclear material and related facilities and is, in fact, regarded as an instrument to set forth international standards with respect to physical protection of nuclear material and associated facilities. The first edition was formulated in 1975 as INFCIRC/225, based on “recommendations for physical protection of nuclear material (1972)”, and has been revised several times and its latest edition, INFCIRC/225.Rev.5, was published in January 2011. This fifth edition newly introduces measures that include setting of limited access areas, graded approaches, the enhancement of defense-in-depth, protection against “Stand-off Attack”, counter measures against insider threats, fostering nuclear security culture as a preventive measure against insider threats, and the provision of redundancy measures to ensure the functions of the central alarm station during an emergency. Being provided with protective measures in accordance with the recommendation made by this fifth edition has been encouraged internationally, with a view to establishing a sufficient nuclear security system. The communique of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 made it clear by declaring that the all participating states were to make efforts to take-up these recommended measures. Therefore, the application status of the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 can serve as an indicator to evaluate the nuclear security system of each country. However, because the information on the application status is limited, this report refers to official statements made available in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts organized by the IAEA (hereinafter, referred as IAEA Nuclear Security Conference), and other opportunities to evaluate the national nuclear security stance and performance of each state.
Application Status of Each Country of the Measures Recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5
The following part summarizes the measures taken by some countries to accommodate the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
In the field of the development of legal instruments, Japan amended its ministerial ordinances in 2011 and 2012, in order to apply the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, such as the setting of limited access areas and the enhancement of vital functions located outside protected areas. France, Belgium, Switzerland, Brazil, and the U.S. have declared that they have also established legal instruments based on the INFCIRC 225/Rev.5. In addition, Turkey has expressed that it is currently working to develop laws and regulations in line with the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
In the area of strengthening the physical protection measures, Australia and South Africa are trying to take measures corresponding to INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5, as well as Indonesia, Sweden, and China, who have stated that they are in the process of applying measures including the enhancement of physical protection systems, as per INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In response to the intrusion incident to the Y-12 National Security Complex in 2011, the U.S. has stated that it has strenghtened physical protection measures at 175 facilities in the country that handle radioactive material and has undertaken the implementation of force-on-force exercises. In addition, Mexico and the UAE have expressed that they are also working towards the application of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 measures through participation in related workshops. Belgium has updated its DBT, which is to serve as a basis for the establishment of its nuclear security requirements, in order to respond to new threats identified by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
As for the measures against sabotage, The Netherlands has stated that it started to apply the risk based categorization for nuclear material and implemented protection measures according to this categorization in January 2013. Republic of Korea (ROK) has also expressed that it is working toward applying INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 measures such as protection measures in accordance with nuclear material categorization. Netherland has declared that it has established its national database for category I and II nuclear material.
With regard to cyber-terrorism, the Netherlands has made it clear that its DBT addresses the threat of cyber-terrorism and that its transport security is in line with the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. ROK has also expressed its use of GPS for real time surveillance as transport security measures. Mexico has declared that it has recommended measures for transport in place.
In the field of protection measures against insider threats, Indonesia has introduced the “two person rule” and, in addition, is working actively to nourish nuclear security culture. In March 2013, it was the first country in the world to conduct the self-assessment of nuclear security culture, in cooperation with the IAEA. Sweden obligates licensees to make efforts to promote nuclear security culture and applies its self-assessment as a regulatory requirement. In addition, Russia and Germany have expressed that they are working to foster a nuclear security culture in their countries through participation in related workshops.
(Table: Application Status of and Efforts for Recommended Measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 on Each)
(Drafted by Kazuko Hamada, Japan Atomic Energy Agency)
 The IAEA is engaged in conducting outreach activities of workshops and regional training courses with the purpose to assist states to taking the measures recommended by this INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Similarly, the U.S. and Japan are also making efforts to promote the understanding of these recommended measures through outreach activities such as workshops.
 “Seoul Communiqué”, 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.
 Progress statements made in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. https://www.nss2014.com/en/nss-2014/reference-documents
 It is defined as “a performance test of the physical protection system that uses designated trained personnel in the role of an adversary force to simulate an attack consistent with the threat or the design basis threat.” INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 recommends to conduct performance tests that include force-on-force exercises at least annually. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “ Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5),” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, 2011.