(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
In the Hiroshima Report 2012, the following issues were surveyed: acceptance and implementation of verification for nuclear weapons reduction; engagement in research and development of verification measures of nuclear weapons reduction; and acceptance of the IAEA verification to fissile material declared as no longer required for military purposes. In 2013, no significant progress was seen on these issues. Russia and the United States have implemented verifications under the New START. Both countries have also discussed verification measures for their fissile material surplus to the defense program with the IAEA, but have not concluded.
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
 Tom Clements, Edwin Lyman and Frank von Hippel, “The Future of Plutonium Disposition,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 43, No. 6 (July/August 2013), p. 11.